

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00403 241723Z

44

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

NSC-05 /088 W

----- 053844

P R 241630Z JUL 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1177

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0403

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: COLLECTIVE COMMITMENTS IN PHASE I

1. WE NOTE THAT, IN FORMULATING THE USG PAPER ON  
ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON WITH-  
DRAWL OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN MBFR (TEXT IN STATE  
169248), WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE INCLUDED IN THE SECOND  
SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 THE CONCEPT OF A COLLECTIVE  
PHASE I COMMITMENT BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE  
THEIR FORCES IN PHASE II. THE SENTENCE IN QUESTION  
READS: QUOTE: IN THE PHASE I AGREEMENT, DIRECT  
PARTICIPANTS WILL COLLECTIVELY COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AGREE  
IN PHASE II ON WHATEVER FURTHER REDUCTIONS WILL BE  
NEEDED TO REACH PARITY IN THE TOTAL OF GROUND AND  
THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR BOTH SIDES. END QUOTE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00403 241723Z

2. PRESUMABLY, THE TERM QUOTE COLLECTIVELY END QUOTE HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THIS TEXT AS REASSURANCE TO THE FRG. WE ASSUME THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES DO NOT MEAN BY THIS LANGUAGE TO IMPLY THAT THE ALLIES WOULD ACTIVELY PUSH THE IDEA OF A COLLECTIVE FORMULATION OF THE ALL PARTICIPANTS FORMULA WITH THE EAST AT THE TIME WHEN THEY ADVANCE OPTION 3 AND PUSH FOR ITS ACCEPTANCE.

3. DISCUSSION IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS DURING THE PAST ROUND HAS SENSITIZED THE EAST TO THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FOR PHASE II. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IF ALLIED REPS IN INTRODUCING OPTION 3 WERE TO ADVANCE THE POSITION THAT THE PROPOSED PHASE I COMMITMENT I COMMITMENT BY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE IN PHASE II WOULD ALSO BE OF COLLECTIVE NATURE, THIS ACTION, FOR WHICH THERE IS NO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT AT PRESENT, WOULD DETRACT FROM THE IMPACT OF OPTION 3.

4. THE DELEGATION CONTINUES TO HOLD THE VIEW THAT A DISTINCTION CAN AND SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, WHICH ARE A POLITICAL AND MILITARY NECESSITY FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, WHICH ARE UNNECESSARY IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON COLLECTIVE

CEILINGS AND WHICH ADD TO THE DIFFICULTY OF NEGOTIATING AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

5. WHEN THE TIME COMES TO NEGOTIATE ACTUAL LANGUAGE, OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT, USING THE COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENT CONCEPT WITH THE IDEA OF DROPPING IT SUBSEQUENTLY MIGHT HAVE SOME LIMITED TRADING VALUE TOWARD GAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT ON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. BUT SUCH A TACTICAL ELEMENT MIGHT BE INTRODUCED AT THAT TIME WITHOUT THE RISK OF ANCHORING IT INTO THE ALLIED POSITION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00403 241723Z

6. WE ALSO ASSUME THAT USE OF THIS PHRASE IN THE US PAPER DOES NOT MEAN THAT, WHEN THE STAGE OF ACTUAL DRAFTING OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT IS REACHED, THE US WILL SUPPORT SOME OF THE MORE EXTREME FORMULATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE COMMITMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADVANCED, SUCH AS THE CONCEPT THAT THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL COULD ANNOUNCE AN ALLIED INTENTION TO REDUCE FORCES DURING A MEETING OF THE NATO COUNCIL

AND THAT A COMMUNIQUE COVERING THIS COUNCIL MEETING  
WOULD SERVE AS EVIDENCE OF A COLLECTIVE WESTERN  
OBLIGATION.

7. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT (MBFR VIENNA 0296 AND MBFR  
VIENNA 0285), ALLIED THINKING OF THIS TYPE IS UNREALISTIC  
BECAUSE IT LEAVES OUT OF ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE  
WARSAW PACT MUST SIGN A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND THAT THE  
WARSAW PACT WILL NOT ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS FROM NATO  
AS SUCH.

8. IT IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE THAT THE EAST MIGHT  
ACCEPT AN APPROACH WHEREBY THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE  
IN PHASE II TAKES THE FORM OF A SINGLE STATEMENT SIGNED  
BY EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THAT THE DIRECT  
PARTICIPANTS COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PARTICIPATE IN  
PHASE II IN THE REDUCTIONS NEEDED TO REACH THE COMMON  
CEILING, BUT THIS SEEMS TO US THE FURTHEST THE EAST  
WOULD GO ON THIS MATTER. WHETHER THE FRG WOULD CONSIDER  
SUCH A COMMITMENT TO BE COLLECTIVE IS ANOTHER QUESTION.  
POSSIBLY THE EAST MIGHT ACCEPT THE SAME STATEMENT  
IN TWO PARALLEL DOCUMENTS TO BE SIGNED BY NATO AND  
WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS RESPECTIVELY, BUT THIS  
IS DOUBTFUL SINCE THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT MAKES  
CLEAR THAT THE EAST CLEARLY ENVISAGES A SINGLE AGREE-  
MENT SIGNED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS. FROM THE  
POINT OF VIEW OF NEGOTIABILITY, WE DOUBT THAT THE  
COLLECTIVE PRINCIPLE CAN BE CARRIED MUCH FURTHER IN  
PRACTICE AS REGARDS THE ALL PARTICIPANTS REDUCTION COMMITMENT.

9. IF THE ASSUMPTIONS IN PARA 2 AND PARA 6 ARE CORRECT  
IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR USNATO TO MAKE THEM  
CLEAR DURING THE OPTION 3 CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00403 241723Z

ANY ALLIED MISUNDERSTANDING.RESOR

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TROOP DEPLOYMENT, OPTION III, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975MBFRV00403  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750255-0859  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750726/aaaaawxa.tel  
**Line Count:** 155  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <09 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: COLLECTIVE COMMITMENTS IN PHASE I  
**TAGS:** PARM, US, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006